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Centering the Periphery: Manchurian
Exile(s) and the North Korean State
Charles K. Armstrong
Kim Il sung and other Manchurian guerrilla veterans who came to dominate North
Korean politics after 1945 were profoundly influenced by the experience of their anti-
Japanese struggle in exile. This influence has shaped the ideology, historiography, and
domestic and external policies of the DPRK to the present. At the same time, this exile
experience has been given a mythical status in North Korean history, centered on the
personality and activities of Kim Il Sung, but reflective of earlier attempts to draw
Manchuria into the mainstream of Korean history. The "mythification" of Manchuria
has grown steadily over time, and since the early 1970s Kim Jong Il has been closely
associated with his father's Manchurian guerrilla struggle, in particular with the image
of Mt. Paektu.
The February 1994 issue of Korea Today, one of the glossy magazines depict-
ing the paradisiacal state of life in North Korea, has on its front cover the Lake
of Heaven (Ch'önji) on Paektusan (or Paektu [whitehead] Mountain), on the
Sino-Korean border. On the inside cover is pictured a pristine alpine lake near
the base of Paektusan, which was allegedly visited by the Dear Leader Kim
Jong Il in the autumn of 1971, who sat by its banks and "gave deep thought to
the future of the Korean revolution while angling."1 In the last few years, the
February issue of these magazines (Kim Jong Il's birthday is in February)
have all had special sections on the alleged "secret guerrilla camp" on Paek-
tusan and the birthplace of Kim Jong II, both of which are historical fictions.
Nevertheless, the apparatuses of North Korean ideology have made great
efforts to link the younger Kim with his father's guerrilla struggles in Man-
churia, and with Paektusan in particular. I will argue that such a connection is
not arbitrary. The purpose of this identification is not merely to associate the
younger Kim with the formative experiences of his father and fellow guerril-
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las, a struggle which has long since surpassed history to take the form of myth.
Paektusan itself is important as a powerful symbol of Korean history and
culture, and its image lends an aura of legitimacy to Kim Il Sung's chosen
heir.
The tallest mountain in the Changbaishan range dividing Korea from
Manchuria, Paektusan has long been a symbol of Korean national identity in
both North and South. Its height, its eerily rugged appearance, and the spec-
tacular crater lake at its peak have contributed to Paektusan's prominence in
the myths of several Northeast Asian cultures. The Manchus, the Mongols,
and the Koreans all have myths that their people originated on Paektusan; one
Korean myth has it that Tangun, ancestor of the Korean people, was born on
the peak of Paektusan. Paektusan figures in Chinese mythology as well, as one
of a chain of sacred mountains linked to the most sacred mountains of all, the
K'unlun chain in the far west.2 More immediately for North Korea, Paektusan
and Manchuria as a whole are important as the site of the anti-Japanese guer-
rilla struggle out of which emerged much of the postliberation DPRK leader-
ship, including Kim Il Sung.
The purpose of this paper is to explore how the nation is dreamed in
exile, and how an experience of exile is in turn dreamed or reimagined by the
state that comes to represent the nation; how Manchuria and Paektusan in
particular, areas peripheral to or actually outside of the geographical bound-
aries of Korea, come to occupy a central space in the construction of North
Korean state mythology after liberation. In short, I would like to spend some
time fishing with Kim Jong II, and if possible share in his languid daydreams
of the Korean revolution.
Shin Ch'ae-ho and the Exile Origins of Nationalist Historiography
Lord Acton, who is famous for a number of pithy sayings, once re-
marked that "exile is the nursery of nationality."3 One can dispute his infantile
imagery; nevertheless, it does seem apparent that modern nationalism, espe-
cially for what we have come to call the "Third World," is often first articu-
lated by those who have left their country of origin, often for the colonial
métropole. Nationalism, though a discourse of the modern West, is articulated
against the colonial power itself and answers the disruptions of capitalism
and colonialism with the defensive solidarity of communal identity. As Homi
Bhabha puts it, "The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communi-
ties and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor."4 It is perhaps
exiles who feel the loss of a nation most acutely, and who—ironically—see
themselves as most qualified to define what the nation is.
Japanese colonialism created such a sense of loss among a great many
Korean intellectuals who saw Korea's nation-building project cut short by
Japan's theft of Korean autonomy. Many left Korea for China, Russia, Japan,
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and the United States, which became competing centers of the independence
movement. But it is Manchuria, a peripheral area with an ambiguous relation-
ship to Korean history, that creates a particularly interesting type of national-
ist articulation that becomes extremely important before and after liberation,
especially in the North.
We can begin with Shin Ch'ae-ho, considered the father of modern
Korean historiography, who invents Korean history from Chinese exile. In
April 1910, Shin and other members of the nationalist Shinminhoe crossed the
YaIu river into Manchuria.5 China was not the colonial métropole, but it was
the focus of a political and intellectual dependence that Shin despised, and the
source of a Confucian orthodoxy that he felt had systematically denied
Korea's autonomous history. Shin carefully utilized Sinocentric traditional
histories to undermine Sinocentrism, which he felt was the necessary first step
to Korean autonomy and national identity. Before Korea could identify itself
against the colonial Other, it first had to separate its identity from its historical
Other, China, and to do so in the interstitial space between China and Korea.
What Koreans must first do, Shin argued, was to overcome their subser-
vient mentality (sadae üishik) and to develop an "autonomous spirit" (chuch'e
üi chöngshin), and this could only be accomplished with a Korea-centered
nationalist history.6
Along the way, Shin reintegrated Manchuria into Korean history. He
was particularly critical of the Samguk sagi for excluding Parhae and Puyö
from Korean history, and he devoted his most important historical work, the
Chosön sangosa, to the history of Koguryö. Shin wandered Northern China
and Manchuria and drew inspiration from his visits to the ruins of Koguryö, as
well as Paektusan.7 All of his major historical work was written during this
exile experience, as well as his unfinished novel Kkum hanül (Dream heaven),
which is not so much a historical novel as an exploration of self-identification
with Korean national history. Shin seems quite literal in his famous statement
in the introduction of the Chosön sangosa—"History is the record of struggle
between the T and the 'non-G "—inasmuch as the individual must totally
identify himself with the nation, and the nation in tum is the subject-centered
self of history.8 Shin Ch'ae-ho's other major historical work, the Chosön
sango munhwasa, dealt with the myth of Tangun, whom Shin saw as the nec-
essary starting point of Korean history, both as the founder of the Korean race
(minjok) and of the first Korean state (kuk).9
Living on the Margins
By the time Shin Ch'ae-ho died in a Japanese prison in 1936, Manchuria
had become the most active center of a nationalist armed resistance against
Japanese colonialism. Among the many guerrilla groups was the organization
with which Kim Il Sung and other future North Korean leaders were involved,
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the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (Dongbei kangri lianjun), a joint
Chinese-Korean organization under the command of the Chinese Communist
Party. The current leaders of the DPRK have attributed tremendous historical
significance to the anti-Japanese armed struggle in this area, and however
exaggerated may be their claims of military success or Korean autonomy
(to be discussed below), it is undeniable that the guerrilla struggle in this
region was the formative experience for those who ultimately came to power
in North Korea, and as such profoundly influenced the shaping of the new
political and social system created in the North.
Thus, a new state and society for North Korea were imagined at the
interstices of colonial control and unregulated frontier, at the meeting point of
rootless intellectuals, political exiles, foreign influence, and a poor but mobile
and relatively independent peasantry.10 Such elements were thrown together
out of the unprecedented dislocation and mobility of the Japanese colonial
project in Korea, later extended to Manchuria, which introduced a new capi-
talist and imperialist "nomadism" to a previously sedentary Korean society."
The Sino-Korean border region had for centuries been an area of exile,
escape, and experimentation. A general decline in rural living standards
throughout the nineteenth century had already disrupted Korean peasant
society by the time the Japanese took over. One consequence of poverty and
social dislocation was frequent peasant rebellion; another was a marked in-
crease in vagrancy and migration.12 Many were forced into the mountains to
attempt a livelihood in precarious slash-and-bum hillside agriculture. Such
people were known as hwajönmin ("fire-field people"). This form of agricul-
tural production, predominantly located in the northernmost areas of North
P'yöngan, South and North Hamgyöng provinces, is an economy of mobility
and independence, in contrast to the sedentary tenant-based farming of the
south.13 But even the remote mountains of northeast Korea were accessible to
the extractive hand of the state, and many peasants moved still farther north,
into Manchuria and Siberia. 1^
Manchuria in particular was a place of opportunity for the displaced
Korean peasant. Despite centuries of contact between Chinese, Jurchen, Mon-
gol, and Korean peoples in this region, Manchuria was in many ways a "new
frontier" at the end of the nineteenth century. From the late seventeenth cen-
tury, the Qing government had restricted migration into the Northeast in an
attempt to preserve the Manchu "homeland" as a pristine natural environment,
but by the middle of the nineteenth century foreign encroachment, first by the
Russians and then by the Japanese, forced the dynasty to adjust its Manchu-
rian policy in order to keep the Northeast in the Qing orbit." All restrictions
on Chinese migration into Manchuria were lifted by 1904,16 and natural disas-
ter, civil war, and economic hardship in North China caused as many as eight
million Chinese to move to Manchuria during the first half of the twentieth
century.17
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Koreans began emigrating to Manchuria in large numbers from the
latter part of the nineteenth century, especially after the famines and peasant
uprisings of the 1860s.18 Initially most Korean immigrants were from the
Hamgyöng provinces, but after Japan annexed Korea in 1910 most new immi-
grants came from the P'yöngan provinces or southern Korea.19 Nevertheless, it
was primarily the immigrants from Hamgyöng who formed the core popula-
tion of the Korean community in Jiandao (Kando in Korean), the region of
eastern Manchuria on the banks of the Tumen river across from Korea that is
now the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region of China's Jilin Province. To
this day, the language spoken by most Koreans in Yanbian is based on the
Hamgyöng dialect.20
By 1920, the Korean population in Manchuria was over 400,000; by
1931, it was over 900,000, 64 percent of whom resided in Jiandao, where they
outnumbered the Chinese residents three to one.21 After the creation of Man-
chukuo in 1932 and Japanese encouragement of Korean emigration to Man-
churia, the Korean population expanded still further, approaching two million
by 1945. Koreans engaged in a highly productive form of paddy rice cultiva-
tion on the fertile Manchurian soil, although at first Korean farmers were not
allowed to own land and worked for Chinese and Manchu landlords.22 The
Korean population of Northeast China was largely peasant, and from quite
impoverished backgrounds at that; they were drawn to Manchuria by the op-
portunity to improve their livelihood and escape economic misery at home.23
But among the poor peasants were a significant number of brigands, outlaws,
petty capitalists, and—increasingly—political renegades and anti-Japanese
nationalists.
As a frontier region, Manchuria was an area of opportunists and vaga-
bonds, political exiles and bandits, self-made men and self-governing peasant
villages. For a century Manchuria was the focus of international rivalry, and as
China declined into anarchy and Russia and Japan struggled for control of this
vast hinterland, the absence of effective state power in the region allowed a
space for local autonomy, self-government, antistate resistance, and more than
a little criminal behavior. Many settlers were "squatters, wanderers, and out-
laws by turn," and illicit opium production played an important part in the
local economy.24 Moreover, the line between banditry and social reform was
not always clear: local bandits known as honghuzi [red beards] were in some
places the only "government," and became quite popular at times for their
Robin Hood-like redistributive practices.25 Owen Lattimore remarked that
Manchuria probably contained more villages formed by outlaws than any
other area in the world, and the British explorer H. E. M. James found "well-
organized, self-governing fugitive settlements" in the Changbaishan region on
the Manchuria-Korean border in 1886.26 Late Qing policies attempting to rees-
tablish taxation in the region encountered well-organized resistance by local
Village Federations (lianchuanghui) established early in this century.27
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It was in this milieu of poor migrants, outlaw bands, clandestine politi-
cal organization, and local resistance that Korean exiles attempted to forge an
armed struggle against Japanese imperialism. From a long-term historical per-
spective, the communists can be seen as part of a tradition of autonomous out-
law and resistance groups linked with local peasant society. In Manchuria,
politically active, exiled intellectuals shared with the local peasants the com-
mon characteristics of mobility and marginality, and such displaced, mobile,
unattached, and disaffected elements, at the fringes of state control, can create
an explosive, indeed revolutionary, combination.28
As the Japanese police and military moved in to control Manchuria in
the early 1930s, a combination of ruthless force, careful surveillance, and
economic incentives "pacified" large segments of the local population, but at
the same time pockets of resistance stiffened and became increasingly radical-
ized, until the last guerrilla bands were driven out in the early 1940s. For a
time, then, this peripheral area became the center of anticolonial resistance for
an important segment of Korean and Chinese revolutionary nationalists. State
control was not fully asserted in this area, and the space for rebellion closed,
until 1949, with the communist victory in China's civil war (for which Man-
churia was a crucial arena) and the establishment of the DPRK (which drew
its most important leadership from the Manchurian struggle).
Anticolonial Struggle
After the Japanese demobilized the Korean army in 1907, intransigent
Korean soldiers created a "Righteous Army" (üibyöng), which engaged with
the Japanese military for several years. By around 1912 the last of the üibyöng
had been defeated, leading a number of remaining activists to retreat to Man-
churia and Siberia where they entered the Korean immigrant communities
there. Military centers were established to train guerrilla forces for combat
across the border in Korea.29 The most famous of these former soldiers was
probably Yi Tong-hwi, who went into exile with several hundred Korean
troops first to the mountains of the north, then to Manchuria, and finally to
Siberia, where he founded the first Korean socialist-oriented party, the Hanin
sahoedang or Korean People's Socialist Party. Thus, Korean communist
armed groups in Manchuria and Siberia were both connected to, and built
upon, a tradition of armed rebellion in exile extending back several decades.30
It is important to see this as more than an "exile movement" far removed
from the activities of Korea proper except for an occasional foray across the
border—like the Provisional Government in Shanghai, sending the odd mes-
senger or terrorist across the Yellow Sea to the peninsula. The border between
Korea and Manchuria was extremely porous, and in many ways the Korean
community in Jiandao was simply an extension of Korea itself; anti-Japanese
activities in southeastern Manchuria and northeastern Korea were closely
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linked until the late 1930s. As Se Hee Yoo has pointed out in his study of
peasant radicalism in colonial Korea, the Hamgyöng provinces adjacent to
Manchuria had the highest incidence of radical peasant organization and anti-
Japanese activity in the 1920s and 1930s, largely under the umbrella of the
Red Peasant Union (Chöksaek nongmin chohap, or nongjo), and both infor-
mation and the activists themselves moved easily back and forth between
these provinces and Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.31 Traditionally a diffi-
cult area for the state to control, the two Hamgyöng provinces were a persis-
tent problem for the Japanese authorities until guerrilla movements on both
sides of the Korea-Manchuria border were wiped out in the brutal "annihila-
tion campaigns" of the late 1930s.32
Kim Il Sung and the Partisan Movement in Manchuria
THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED ARMY
There is very little documentation on Kim before 1945 that can be veri-
fied as genuine. Most of his writings and the descriptions of his political activ-
ities from that period in current North Korean literature are fabrications that
have steadily attributed ever greater revolutionary feats to the young Kim as
the cult of the Great Leader has developed. The purpose of this material
is clearly not history in any scholarly sense, but myth-creation, as will be
discussed below. Contemporary references to Kim appear primarily in two
places: the records of the Japanese police and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). A large number of the latter, in the form of memoirs and documents
pertaining to the anti-Japanese struggle in the Northeast, have emerged from
the People's Republic since the 1980s. Although PRC sources are not without
their biases, they seem to be as reliable a guide as can be found to the nature of
the Manchurian communist resistance and to Kim's place in it.
Kim's major guerrilla activities were with the CCP-directed Northeast
Anti-Japanese United Army (Dongbei kangri lianjun) between about 1934
and 1940. The fact that Kim fought under Chinese command and was himself
a member of the CCP has disappeared from North Korean histories, which
refer instead to Kim's leadership of a "Korean People's Revolutionary Army"
(Chosön inmin hyöngmyönggun), based perhaps on the CCP's "Northeast Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army" (Dongbei renmin gemingjun), in which Kim may
have been involved but certainly not as the leader, and which was active in
Manchuria from September 1933 until it fell victim to a Japanese "punitive
expedition" in February 1936.33 On the other hand, the purpose of the Chinese
materials is clearly to glorify the CCP and the Chinese Revolution, and the
participation of Kim and other Koreans is rarely emphasized. Indeed, Chinese
sources give the impression that Korean communists were relatively ineffec-
tive, ridden with factionalism and "leftism," until they came under the wise
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leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.34 Understandably, both Chinese
and North Korean sources downplay or ignore the very real tensions between
Korean and Chinese activists, as well as among the population as a whole, but
in different ways: the Chinese by making the Koreans an "important minority
group" in the Chinese revolution, the Koreans by treating Korean activities as
completely independent of the Chinese Communist Party.35
There is one interesting critique on the base areas and the guerrilla
struggle in Manchuria written by Kim Il Sung himself. Possibly the only veri-
fiable piece of writing by Kim before liberation, this "unit report" on the First
Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NEAJUA) was written in
1942 after Kim's retreat to the Soviet Union.36 Written in Chinese in a terse,
functional style, the report lacks any of the rhetorical flourishes or grandiose
statements of the later writings attributed to Kim. Kim gives a frank appraisal
of the First Army in which he fought, its successes, its shortcomings, and its
ultimate failure. He gives a sense of the difficulty of the anti-Japanese struggle
in the face of tremendous physical, geographical, and political obstacles.
In 1932, according to Kim, base areas and "Soviet governments" were
established in four provinces of East Manchuria, the area covered by the First
Army. Later called "People's Revolutionary Governments," nine areas were
created altogether. On 18 November 1933, a Japanese force of about 1000
attacked the guerrillas, who finally repulsed the invaders after a 16-day battle.
The cost of their success was high: in Yanji county alone 150 Japanese, but
over 500 guerrillas, were killed. The revolutionary bases seem to have been
abandoned after 1935.
In August 1933, the Northeast Anti-Japanese People's Revolutionary
Army (NEAJPRA) was created. Kim joined the First Independent Army of
the NEAJPRA, which was composed mostly of Koreans, although its com-
mander, Yang Jingyu, was Chinese. (Its political commissar, Song Ch'öl-an,
was Korean). This seems to be the origin of Kim's later claim to have led a
"Korean People's Revolutionary Army" in Manchuria.
Kim notes several "errors" in the East Manchurian guerrilla movement
of the early 1930s. First, the guerrillas "engaged with the Japanese unneces-
sarily several times instead of building forces gradually." Second, they took a
"leftist" line against landlords and peasants, as well as refusing to combine
forces with other nationalist groups, rather than forming a united front. Third,
the constant Japanese surveillance and suspicion of infiltration led to self-
destructive purges. The anti-Minsaengdan struggle in particular led to the
deaths of "more than a few innocent comrades." These "left errors" were cor-
rected after 1935 with the establishment of a united front and the NEAJUA.
The period between 1936 and 1939 was a high point for the First Army,
in which its forces expanded and engaged successfully with the Japanese. But
this period of success was brief. The years 1939 to 1941 "could be called the
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period when our forces suffered loss," as Kim euphemistically puts it. Mas-
sive punitive expeditions (datufou) decimated the guerrillas' ranks. In the end
there was "too great a gap between the enemy forces and our own." The guer-
rilla movement, Kim admits, ended in disappointment.
This is not the Kim Il Sung of North Korean state mythology, who led
an ever-victorious Korean army in dealing blow after telling blow against a
fierce but fallible Japanese imperialist force. But it is the record of an obser-
vant and dedicated guerrilla fighter. It describes a group of partisans with a
tremendous determination to win against overwhelming odds, willing to take
enormous and at times foolhardy risks, who felt themselves the only legiti-
mate representatives of a people oppressed by imperialism and "feudal ves-
tiges," and who attempted to link themselves with the poor peasantry of the
remote Manchurian countryside in order to win back for them the land stolen
by ruthless invaders. It was an experience that fostered determination, secrecy,
united front tactics, and an emphasis on mobilizing the marginal elements of
society—including poor peasants, women, and youth—as well as a lack of tol-
erance for dissent, a ruthlessness toward the enemy, a driving nationalism, and
a fierce anti-imperialism. That all of these elements are at the forefront of
North Korean politics today may not be entirely attributable to the Manchu-
rian guerrilla struggle, but its contribution can hardly be overestimated.
MANCHURIA AS MYTH
However, the real significance of the Manchurian experience for North
Korea may lie not so much in its historical reality, but in its function as the
central founding myth of the North Korean state. According to DPRK offi-
cial history, everything the current North Korean state claims to represent—
nationalism, socialism, the chuch'e ideology—is first imagined and articu-
lated by Kim during his Manchurian exodus. The "mythification" of the Man-
churian partisan struggle begins almost immediately after liberation, and has
grown steadily over time. At the center of this, of course, is Kim Il Sung.
It is easy enough to expose the distortions, exaggerations, and outright
lies in the North Korean story of Kim's "revolutionary struggle" in Man-
churia. But to point out "factual errors" is to miss the point entirely. In the
DPRK this experience is not history, but epic, a semireligious tale of loss and
redemption. Although textual supports are used to demonstrate the "facticity"
of these events—revolutionary graffiti carved into Manchurian trees, miracu-
lously preserved from the 1930s; Japanese newspaper articles, genuine and
forged—historical proof is ultimately irrelevant. North Korean historians can
be compared to the chroniclers of the Middle Ages: "By basing their histori-
cal tales on a divine plan of salvation—an inscrutable one—they have from
the very start lifted the burden of demonstrable explanation from their own
shoulders."37
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This "salvation" is of the nation (minjok), represented by Kim both
politically and metaphorically. Kim is the premier nomad, whose wander-
ing in the Manchurian wilderness stands for the exile of all Korean people
from their colonized homeland. David Apter interprets Mao in Yanan as an
Odysseus-figure, wandering in exile, who becomes a kind of "Chinese
Socrates in full possession of logic and word."38 Kim also resembles Odys-
seus, but a more fitting image is Moses, leading the chosen people out from
foreign oppression through a wilderness of exile to the promised land. How
much Kim's Christian missionary education and deeply devout mother influ-
enced this apparent use of Old Testament imagery may never be known.
Needless to say, North Korean texts never acknowledge any such influence.39
At the age of twelve Kim "crossed the YaIu river into exile,"40 deter-
mined to return to the center and recreate it. Whether or not the young Kim
really had such thoughts, the experience of exile often creates a longing for
the nation, perhaps even an imagining of the nation for the first time. The
myth of Kim's Manchurian experience seems intended to stress the need for a
powerful symbolic center in Korean politics, around which a nation can make
sense of its existence; a center that is, in the words of Clifford Geertz, imbued
with sacred authority and "connected to the way the world is built."41
Kim himself is this lost center. In his recently published autobiography,
Kim "remembers" that in 1931, after the failure of uncoordinated acts of sabo-
tage and terrorism against Japanese authority, older and more experienced
Korean resistance fighters took Kim as their leader because they realized that
"in order to win back the country the twenty million Korean people must
unite, and that in order to unite in mind and purpose they must have a center of
leadership, a center of unity."42 In his interpretation of North Korea's "corpo-
ratist" ideology, Bruce Cumings uses the metaphor of concentric circles radi-
ating outward from Kim Il Sung. Immediately surrounded by his family and
his Manchurian cohorts, Kim is the center of power, benevolence and love
expanding in ever-widening circles to embrace the whole Korean people.43
From the periphery of exile, Kim creates a new center and embodies it in his
own person.
North Korean histories are strangely silent about Kim's activities be-
tween 1941 and 1945, perhaps because references to his retreat to the USSR
would undermine Kim's image as an ever-victorious nationalist leader. Never-
theless, even during this period Kim is presented as the embodiment of revo-
lutionary hopes whose reputation serves as "encouragement" for the workers,
students, and peasants struggling against their colonial oppressors. Kim is the
absent redeemer who will soon return to deliver his people to independence.
According to Kim's official biography, in 1944 mysterious handbills appeared
at the Pyongyang Arsenal saying "In a few days, General Kim Il Sung will
come," while civilian guards in South Ch'ungch'öng put up a slogan reading
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"Youth of Korea . . . wait for Kim Il Sung to return in triumph."44 By 1945
"the name of General Kim Il Sung became the sun and symbol of deliverance
for the Korean people in all parts of the country from Mt. Baikdoo [Paektu] to
Cheju Island in the South Sea."45
This brings us back to Paektusan and Kim Jong Il's fishing excursion.
To the ancient mythical, shamanistic significance of Paektusan has been added
more contemporary connotations of the present North Korean state's revolu-
tionary heritage. Although not the site of much actual guerrilla activity, Paek-
tusan has become a prominent symbol of what Clifford Geertz called "the
inherent sacredness of sovereign power."46 North Korean slogans seek to
inspire the population with the "spirit of Mt. Paektu," well-publicized Youth
League visits to the peak reenact (probably fictional) guerrilla battles, and citi-
zens make "pilgrimages" to the Heavenly Lake. Over time, Paektusan has
increased in prominence in North Korean propaganda, becoming perhaps the
most important image, next to that of Kim himself—and the two are often por-
trayed together, Kim standing at the mountain's summit—through which the
state symbolizes its legitimacy. In recent years, as we have seen, Paektusan
has even been named as the fictive birthplace of Kim Jong II, linking the
younger Kim not only to his father's guerrilla struggles, but also to one of the
most powerful images of Korea's culture and history. Paektusan, and Manchu-
ria as a whole, function as a mythical space, the site of a revolution both inside
and outside of Korea, both inside and outside of history; a frontier of unlim-
ited possibility and, at the same time, a center, a home, the birthplace of the
minjok.
From Marxist Historiography to Chuch'e
Paektusan does not appear much in North Korean mythography until the
1960s. (Kim Il Sung does not appear to have actually fought any battles in that
area.) But it becomes increasingly identified with Kim Jong Il from the 1970s.
To return to our original image, then, what was Kim Jong Il doing on Paektu-
san in the autumn of 1971? It was precisely at this time, in the early 1970s,
when Kim Il Sung began to groom his son as his successor. Kim Jong Il grad-
ually rose in prominence in the Worker's Party until his succession was made
public at the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980.47 By putting Kim Jong Il
at the base of Paektusan in 1971, just as this process was about to begin, the
North Korean state symbolically links him with the origins of the Korean race,
to Tangun, to the center of Korean history and political power.
In addition, from the beginning of the 1960s onward Manchuria gradu-
ally becomes centered in a nationalist historiography that owes much more to
Shin Ch'ae-ho than to Karl Marx. Rather than go over the development of
North Korean historiography from the 1950s to the late 1970s, when a consen-
sus was reached in the general periodization and articulation of North Korean
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historiography, let me encapsulate this development in two quotes. Marx
began the Communist Manifesto with the famous declaration, "The history of
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."48 In contrast, a
standard contemporary North Korean history begins with the statement,
"Human history is a history of struggle of the people for Chajusöng [auton-
omy or independence]."49 This is a subjective, nation-centered history that
almost perfectly reflects Shin Ch'ae-ho's struggle between the "I" and the
"non-I." Of course, the "I" in this case is Kim Il Sung, who represents the sub-
jectivity of the Korean people.
North Korean historiography from the 1970s onward has stressed the
unique, even sui generis, nature of Korean civilization going back to Old
Chosön, whose capital, Wanggömsöng, is now located in the Liao River basin
in Manchuria rather than near Pyongyang.50 Nangnang, then, was not a Chi-
nese commandery but a Korean kingdom, based in the area of Pyongyang.
Slavery begins with the Three Kingdoms period, putting ancient Korea at a
level of civilization equal to that of China. Finally, the North Korean histories
argue against the concept of Unified Shilla and view Korea between the sev-
enth and tenth centuries as divided between Shilla in the South and Parhae in
the North, the latter seen as the successor to Koguryö.51 Korea, then, only
becomes unified under Koryö.
However, it is in the modern period that the nationalist trope organizing
North Korean historiography becomes most evident. Modern history (kün-
daesa) begins in the 1 860s and 1 870s, not so much because this is the period
of incipient capitalism, as earlier North Korean histories argued, but because
this is the moment of foreign encroachment and nationalist resistance. Indeed,
the beginning of kündaesa can be precisely dated to 1 866, when the USS Gen-
eral Sherman sailed up the Taedong river and was attacked by a patriotic mob
led by Kim Il Sung's great-grandfather, Kim Ung-u. Similarly, contemporary
history (hyöndaesa) no longer begins in 1945, with liberation and the begin-
nings of socialism, but in 1926, when Kim Il Sung allegedly formed the
"Down With Imperialism Union" in Jilin City, Manchuria, to fight against the
Japanese.52
Kim Il Sung's death in July 1994 and Kim Jong Il's succession to power
signify the passing of North Korea's first generation of guerrilla revolutionar-
ies. The few hundred Manchurian cohorts of Kim Il Sung, who have formed
the core of the DPRK leadership since the regime's inception in 1948, will
soon all be gone from the scene. Nevertheless, the system they established
remains in place, a system created in part out of their exile experience, a
society held together by "iron discipline" against a hostile outside world,
which one Japanese scholar describes as a "guerrilla band state" (yúgekitai
kokka).53 The DPRK has attempted to maintain an unbreakable bond between
the new leadership and the old, and to place Kim Jong Il's own past into the
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Manchurian exile movement, even putting his birthplace, like that of Tangun,
atop Paektusan. It is still too early to know whether the dream of exile that
was the formative experience of North Korea's first leaders and the founding
myth of the state they created can sustain North Korea in the future, or
whether new narratives of the nation will have to be written.
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